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Introduction 
 
People in Europe – as in many other parts of the world – fear about their per-
sonal safety and feel rather insecure. According to Eurobarometer (2017), alt-
hough the large majority of Europeans tend to feel quite secure in their imme-
diate city and neighbourhood, they tend to be less convinced about their coun-
try and much less so about the European Union in comparison to previous 
years. Among others, people in Europe tend to regard challenges to the inter-
nal security of the EU as important, particularly terrorism and organised 
crime. Factors that may have influenced the security feelings of EU citizens 
may have to do with the ‘recent’ refugee ‘crisis’ (for a critical account of the 
refugee ‘crisis’ see Siegel and Nagy, 2018), the terror ‘threat’ and recent at-
tacks carried out by terror groups (or simply isolated individuals) in many EU 
cities, along with more general late modern fears, also linked to the effects of 
the 2007 financial crisis, which have often translated in governmental cuts in 
spending, especially affecting social policy.  
 The diffuse concerns about individual and social security, which have re-
sulted from changes in the late modern society in which we live (see, e.g., 
Bauman, 1987; Young, 1973, 1999; Waquant, 2008; Ponsaers, 2012), have 
led many European countries in recent years to intensify state intervention in 
                                                          
1  Anna Di Ronco is a Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Essex (UK). 
Anna Sergi is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Essex (UK).  
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the area of security and public order. To quickly respond to widespread fears 
and anxieties over the problem of safety and of physical and psychological 
integrity, which are often amplified by the media reporting on certain crime-
related events or issues (Reiner, 2002), politicians and policy makers in many 
EU countries have adopted punitive security measures targeting both incivili-
ties (nuisance, disorder, anti-social behaviour) and more ‘serious’ forms of 
crime regarded as organised crime or terrorism, with several negative impli-
cations for individuals’ liberties, social inclusion and integration. 
 On the one hand, punitive measures (not only ‘proper’ criminal justice 
measures, but also measures that are civil or administrative in their form yet 
punitive or criminal in their nature; Van Duyne and Van der Vorm, 2017) have 
been used against ‘incivilities’, or any behaviour or even social group consid-
ered a ‘nuisance’, ‘unsightly’ or annoying for powerful majorities despite not 
necessarily causing harm to others.2 These measures have often been 
grounded on the assumed link between social and physical disorder with more 
serious forms of criminality. The underlying conviction is that if not tackled 
from its root ‘causes’ (disorder or incivilities) ‘serious’ crime would otherwise 
thrive in the city or city areas (for the example of England see, e.g., Burney, 
2005; Innes and Jones, 2006; Squires, 2008). On the other hand, some threats, 
perceived as increasingly serious and potentially very harmful due to their 
reach – national or transnational – or their impact on different communities, 
have been “securitised”.  
 This means that the realm of security – and especially national security – 
has enlarged to comprehend also crime issues (Farrand & Carrapico, 2012). 
This has certainly been the case with organised crime (Campbell, 2014) and 
cybercrime (Lavorgna and Sergi, 2016). While both are umbrella terms that 
include different types of misconducts, the potential harm associated to the 
                                                          
2  Some of the conducts generally considered ‘anti-social’ or a ‘nuisance’ are or can 
be, to be sure, harmful and seriously offensive to people, at least at times. Arson, 
vandalism and physical assault do cause serious harm to others; however, these 
conducts tend to be already punished by criminal law proper and are often not in 
need of being re-regulated by other legal systems (e.g., civil or administrative). By 
the same token, certain behaviour that is included in and punished through security 
policies is certainly harmless, as the case of young people hanging about in public 
spaces, which may be considered as causing ‘distress’ to certain dominant social 
groups and thus be penalised.  
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‘transnationality’ of organised crime and the ubiquity of cybercrime have el-
evated their seriousness for the national system and therefore subsumed both 
concepts within the national security context alongside threats of terrorism 
and concerns over border safety (Sergi, 2017). 
 These two processes have been observed both at state levels and in regional 
agendas and often intertwine. At the EU level, for example, EU institutions 
have given recognition to the importance of people’s (in)securities and fears, 
which may be engendered by both organised crime and disorder/petty crimes. 
Local crime and disorder (including incivilities like graffiti, vandalism, noise 
nuisance and unruly or aggressive behaviour) have been included in the EU 
crime prevention (henceforth: CP) strategy for them engendering fear and in-
securities among Europeans. Most importantly, they are considered as being 
conducive to more serious forms of transnational and organised criminality 
(Crawford, 2002; Di Ronco, 2016) – regardless of their actual ‘seriousness’ or 
proven cross-border dimension.3 This reasoning, which has justified the grant-
ing of EU funding to national and local CP initiatives targeting low-level 
crime and disorder (Di Ronco, 2016), obviously resonates with the Broken 
Windows rationale (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Thereby it supports its argued 
causal link between disorder, fear and crime, which has long been discredited 
in the literature (see, e.g. Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004; Sampson, 2009). 
 Organised crime, on its part, is considered a phenomenon that ‘undermines 
the values and prosperity of our open societies’ (EU Council, 2010: 2). Con-
sequently, it is seen as a serious threat to the EU. As the EU Council states: 
‘people have the right to expect the European Union to address the threat to 
their freedom and legal rights posed by serious crime’ (EU Council 2000: 1). 
                                                          
3  For example, in two policy documents of the European Commission (2000) and 
Council (2001), where they proposed (in the former) and deliberated (in the latter) 
the establishment of the European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN), crime 
has been defined as any ‘anti-social conduct which, without necessarily being a 
criminal offence, can by its cumulative effect generate a climate of tension and 
insecurity’ (European Commission, 2000), and crime prevention as a group of 
‘measures that are intended to reduce or otherwise contribute to reducing crime 
and citizens’ feeling of insecurity’ (Council of the European Union, 2001). As put 
it by Crawford (2002: 44), the logic behind these policies – and the importance 
they place on insecurities and fears – lies in the ‘perceived interconnectedness of 
transnational developments and highly localised activities’. 
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However, as it has already been observed (Carrapico, 2014), the approxima-
tion of the organised crime concept at the EU level has led to an enlargement 
of the anti-organised crime strategy, which has come to include both the pro-
tection of the single market and the protection of citizens due to the perceived 
increase of the threat and its seriousness for the EU. Most of EU criminal law 
actually comes from the need to tackle some sort of serious and/or organised 
crime. After the Lisbon Treaty, in fact, ‘seriousness’ is embedded in the ra-
tionale of EU criminal law, in the recognition that the EU can and should in-
tervene to maintain citizens safe and borders secure from crime and criminals. 
This trend is also visible in the enhancement of the mandate of Europol, which 
originally required that there had to be “factual indications that an organised 
criminal structure [was] involved”.4 But in 2009, this was broadened to cover 
“serious crime affecting two or more member states”.5 Thus by inserting the 
feature ‘serious’, Europol is effectively involved whenever a serious crime – 
also not organised in its nature – is committed with a cross-border dimension, 
even in cases when Mutual Legal Assistance and bilateral agreements would 
suffice. In other words, the recognition of the seriousness in itself and organ-
ised crime types pushes the necessity for the EU and EU-wide institutions to 
take a more forceful step in the criminalisation and the prevention of such 
crimes.  
 Drawing on the crime prevention and organised crime literature, and on 
examples taken from the authors’ previous research, this chapter discusses the 
implications of an expanded realm of CP to behaviour that – independently 
from its seriousness – is considered to be conducive to further criminality (as 
in the case of incivilities) and/or to involve an organised crime group. In es-
sence, we argue that two processes occurring at the same time are expanding 
the remit and reach of CP:  
                                                          
4  Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the estab-
lishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) – Official Journal C 
316, 27/11/1995 P. 0002 –0032 –  
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriS-
erv.do?uri=CELEX:41995A1127(01):EN:HTML. 
5  Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Euro-
pol) OJ L 121,15.5.2009 –  
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32009D0371. 
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1. the increasing fears and insecurities among people have called for the ap-
plication of prevention mechanisms also via criminalisation from below, 
in light of the connection between local disorder with (more serious forms 
of) crime;  
2. the securitisation of certain concepts – such as organised crime – increases 
the perceptions of the seriousness of certain conducts and crimes and leads 
to excessive responses against them.  
 
This chapter will also question whether – given its limited competence in CP 
– the EU has the potential to influence national and local ways of doing CP, 
at least through soft law mechanisms including the circulation of best practices 
by some of its bodies and networks. 
 
 
Expanded Crime Prevention: its object, agencies and lim-
its (in theory) 
 
The (liberal) critical criminological literature is quite unanimous in arguing 
that roughly in the last thirty years we have witnessed a reconfiguration of 
security and its modes of governance (Jones, 2012) and, therefore, a change 
in the CP complex. Particularly, a change has occurred, among others, to the 
‘criminal’ behaviour that is subject to criminalisation. This applies in particu-
larly to criminal justice and other punitive measures, which have often in-
cluded behaviour that is harmless and had previously been tolerated. A change 
has also affected the number and nature of the local, national and EU agencies 
that are competent for the prevention, prosecution and punishment of ‘crime, 
including ‘serious’ crime. These agencies have expanded up to including part-
nerships, citizens involvement, private security firms etc. This expansion in 
CP has resulted in policies and practices that have often exceeded the limits 
set out by our constitutional systems and theorised by criminal law theorists 
and philosophers, and dangerously eroded individual’s exercise of civil liber-
ties.  
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Object  
 
The expansion in CP has been reflected in its goals, which, as put it by Garland 
(2001: 16-17), have broadened to include “prevention, security, harm-reduc-
tion, loss-reduction, fear-reduction—that are quite different from the tradi-
tional goals of prosecution, punishment, and ‘criminal justice’”. According to 
social theorists of risk, CP is currently dominated by an anticipatory logic 
(Zedner, 2007; Pleysier, 2015, 2017), which emphasises the importance of 
preventing the public from future harms and protecting it from ‘risk’ (Beck, 
1992). In contemporary actuarial justice (Freely and Simon, 1994), individual 
and collective assessments of what constitutes a ‘risk group’ may largely be 
affected by public perceptions and fears, also fuelled by the media and con-
tingent ‘moral panics’ (for a case of fears shaping the national security policy 
and its reliance on ‘risk profiles’, see van Swaaningen, 2005).6 Fears and a 
more generalised sense of ‘ontological insecurity’ (Giddens, 1991) are caused, 
among others, by the growing social polarisation and economic inequality, 
and the fragmentation and individualisation of society. All these develop-
ments have contributed to the contemporary heightened fear of the ‘other’ 
(Furedi, 1997, 2004) and to the adoption by many countries and cities of pub-
lic reassurance initiatives. These cover a broad behavioural field, including 
anti-social behaviour legislations (Waiton, 2008a, 2008b) that aim at protect-
ing the public from feeling negative emotions including fear (Peršak, 2017). 
 As put quite eloquently by Crawford (2009: 15), contemporary CP has put 
its “emphasis on wider social problems, including public perceptions and fear 
of crime, quality of life, broadly defined harms, incivilities and disorder”. To 
enhance people’s ‘quality of life’ and reduce fears and perceived ‘risks’, crime 
control at the local level has also intertwined with urban revitalisation projects 
– what is known as ‘gentrification’ – in many European cities (Peršak and Di 
Ronco, 2018).  
 The importance of protecting public spaces through urban design and revi-
talisation has also been emphasised at the EU level. In two of its recent com-
munications, for example, the Commission has suggested a number of 
                                                          
6  Risks can be assessed through a probabilities calculus or, in the post-risk society, 
through the principle of ‘precaution’ – a response to uncertainty that operates by 
imagining worse case scenarios of possible inaction. This is what O’Malley (2017) 
called ‘speculative pre-emption’: “[i]f it can be imagined, it must be governed”. 
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measures intended to support member states and local authorities within them 
in their efforts to reduce the vulnerability of public spaces, in particular against 
terrorist attacks. These measures include the allocation of funding, and the 
organisation of initiatives aimed at bringing together relevant stakeholders (in-
cluding private actors or ‘operators’, local and national authorities, practition-
ers etc.) and at sharing information and best practices between them (European 
Commission, 2017, 2018a). 
 Scholars from many disciplines, including not only criminology and soci-
ology, but also urban planning, urban studies, and critical geography, have 
warned against the negative and exclusionary effects that spatial ‘cleansing’ 
or spatial ‘purification’ have on the ‘undeserving minorities’ (the poor, young 
people, ethnic minorities etc.) (see, e.g., Atkinson and Helms, 2007; Bannister 
et al., 2006; Belina and Helms, 2003; Sibley, 1995; Smith, 2005). The spatial 
and social exclusion of these minorities is often accomplished through gentri-
fication, which tends to drive up the housing prices. In gentrified urban spaces, 
moreover, individual’s behaviour is also controlled and punished through reg-
ulations and particular policing styles (e.g., zero tolerance policing). For ex-
ample, place bans, administrative and civil measures and fines mainly target 
behaviour or social groups that are considered a ‘nuisance’, ‘unsightly’ or an-
noying for dominant majorities despite not necessarily causing harm to others. 
These coercive regulations and measures have been adopted not only in the 
UK with the New Labour’s infamous ASBOs starting from the 1990s (see e.g. 
Burney, 2005, and Squires, 2008), but also in many other European countries 
(Peršak, 2017) and cities (Di Ronco, 2014, 2016), despite the negative evalu-
ation of many national supreme courts (Di Ronco and Peršak, 2014).      
 The expansion of CP has not only occurred ‘downwards’, towards low 
level crime – if we can talk about ‘crime’ at all. As pointed out by Hörnqvist 
(2004), the ‘security mentality’ that dominates current criminal justice has 
‘ruptured the law’ – and compromised its legal protections – both upwards 
and downwards, i.e., by erasing the line between crime and acts of war (as in 
the case of terrorism) and between crime and incivilities, respectively.  
 In a similar vein, in Europe the security mentality (legitimised by the too 
often invoked state of ‘emergency’) has justified the use of crime control 
measures – including incarceration – against asylum seekers and refugees 
from war zones in the Middle East and northern Africa. These victims of acts 
of war have often been assessed as ‘risk groups’ and framed in some countries 
156 
 
as ‘criminals’ and ‘terrorist’ (see Berry et al., 2015). The practice of detaining 
migrants for administrative purposes has been critically analysed in “crimmi-
gration” studies (e.g., Guia et al., 2011; van der Woude et al., 2017). Such 
detention is said to be required to establish their identities, or to facilitate their 
immigration claims resolution or their removal. However, they are de facto 
incarcerated, often without them having committed a crime. This has been 
much problematised in the light of excessive interference with individual’s 
rights (see e.g. Welch and Shuster, 2005).  
 
Agencies  
 
In his work, the French philosopher Michael Foucault understood and concep-
tualised power not as an exclusive prerogative of the state, but as something 
dispersed throughout the social field and used by institutions as diverse as the 
family, the church, schools, prisons etc. to control individuals and their be-
haviour. Working within the Foucauldian tradition of ‘governmentality’ 
(which, as put by Newburn (2007: 325), focuses not only on the state but also 
on the “nature and rationalities of certain social and political practices”), gov-
ernmentality theorists have discussed how governmental power and control, 
including crime control, are dispersed in the social field. Agencies of social 
control have expanded much beyond the police, which is only one of the actors 
responsible for the prevention and control of crime. In addition to the military 
– deployed at least occasionally or in some EU countries, including France, 
Belgium and Italy, after the 2015-2017 terror attacks – also private actors 
share competences in CP (Garland, 2001): individuals, community groups 
(neighbour watch or warden schemes), private security actors, various local 
agents, and private-public partnerships. This ‘dispersal of discipline’ (Cohen, 
1985) produced what Stan Cohen described, using his famous fishing meta-
phor, the ‘widening of the net’ and ‘thinning of the mesh’ of the criminal jus-
tice system. In practice, this results in more people being ‘captured’ and re-
tained in the criminal justice ‘net’ for behaviour that had previously been ac-
cepted or tolerated. Obviously this pushes towards more serious responses to 
those forms of conduct already criminalised. Because of the need to justify the 
enlarging justice net for previously accepted/tolerated behaviours, low-level 
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and mid-level offences rise to more serious ranks and attract more severe sen-
tences. An example of this is in the UK Public Order Act 1986, which now 
recognises the offence of ‘Affray’ as triable-either-way depending on ‘the se-
riousness of the effect that the behaviour of the accused has on members of 
the public who may have been put in fear’7.  
 The expansion of the penal sphere throughout society has much been prob-
lematized by critical scholars, who have also linked it to the sharpening of 
insecurities and anxieties, to the reduced tolerance towards low level crime 
and incivilities, and to greater public demands for security (e.g., Tonry, 2004). 
 Law enforcement agencies operating in the crime prevention field have 
multiplied at the EU level as well (during a relatively long process and not 
without resistance of member states, see e.g. Baker, 2010). They are especially 
directed at tackling the so-called ‘EU crimes’, or particularly serious crimes 
with a cross-border dimension such as terrorism, trafficking in human beings 
and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit 
arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of 
payment, computer crime and ‘organised crime’. Since the 2009 Treaty of 
Lisbon, indeed, the EU Parliament and Council have been given the power to 
legislate in criminal matters (articles 82 and 83 TFEU). In short, following the 
ordinary legislative procedure, the Parliament and Council can establish min-
imum rules:  
i.  to the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and 
judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
having a cross-border dimension; and  
ii.  to approximate definitions of particularly serious crimes with a cross-bor-
der dimension and their sanctions.  
 
                                                          
7  Affray is an offence under section 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 and is triable-
either-way. The maximum penalty on conviction on indictment is 3 years' impris-
onment and/or a fine of unlimited amount. On summary conviction the maximum 
penalty is 6 months' imprisonment and/or a fine not exceeding level 5. Under sec-
tion 3 of the Act, it must be proved that a person has used or threatened:  unlawful 
violence towards another and his conduct is such as would cause a person of rea-
sonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety. -  See Crown 
Prosecution Service’s Legal Guidance on Public Order Offences Incorporating 
Charging Standards at 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/public-order-offences-incorporating-
charging-standard.  
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Article 87 (2) TFEU also enables the EU to establish measures on police co-
operation involving all the member states’ competent authorities (including 
police, customs and other specialised law enforcement services), in particular 
concerning the collection, storage and exchange of information relevant for 
the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences (letter a) and 
common investigation techniques in relation to the detection of serious forms 
of organised crime (letter b), in particular through enhanced operational pow-
ers of Europol. For example, in April 2018, the European Commission put 
forward a proposal for laying down the rules facilitating the use of financial 
and other information for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecu-
tion of certain criminal offences, including serious and organised crime, as 
required by the European Agenda on Security adopted in April 2015 (Euro-
pean Commission, 2015) and its follow up Action Plan on strengthening the 
fight against terrorist financing (European Commission, 2016). As the Euro-
pean Commission (2018b: 3-4) states, CP is at the core of the criminal law 
framework against serious and organised crime.  
 This proposal complements and builds on the preventive side of the Money 
Laundering Directive8 and reinforces the legal framework from the point of 
view of police cooperation. Furthermore, this proposal for a Directive rein-
forces and builds the Union criminal law framework with regard to the fight 
against serious offences, in particular Regulation (EU) 2016/794 on the Euro-
pean Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). 
 
Limits  
Expanding the ambit and agencies of CP carries, however, dangerous impli-
cations for civil liberties. Modern democracies are based in their core on the 
liberal idea of individual autonomy, which is predicated on a limited and ex-
ceptional use of (criminal) measures restricting individual’s rights. In other 
                                                          
8  Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 
2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money 
laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 
2006/70/EC (OJ L 141 of 5.6.2015, p. 73) – as amended in December 2017 (5th 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive). 
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words, the criminal law – and punitive measures alike – is considered excep-
tional or a last resort (extrema ratio), and is thus only allowed for the most 
severe violations of constitutionally protected “goods” (values or interests). 
“Substantive” (Peršak, 2007) reasons for criminalisation instruct the legislator 
on the content of the criminal law or on which behaviour it can legitimately 
criminalise. The most accepted and recognised grounds for criminalisation are 
the harm and offence principles (see Feinberg, 1984; Jareborg, 2004; Peršak, 
2007; Simester and von Hirsch, 2006, 2011). In addition to these substantive 
reasons, there are also formal principles that the policy-maker ought to follow 
to properly criminalise human behaviour (Peršak, 2007). Such formal princi-
ples are, for example, the principles of legality and proportionality.9 Because 
of the EU accession to the ECHR and the adoption of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union (henceforth: the Charter), which have 
both occurred with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has 
also given recognition to these two formal principles of criminalisation. Par-
ticularly, at article 52(1)10 the Charter crystalises the principle of proportion-
ality: 
 
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by 
this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those 
rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations 
may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of 
general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights 
and freedoms of others.  
 
These formal principles – and particularly, to our purposes, the proportionality 
principle – appear, for example, in the European Agenda on Security, where 
                                                          
9  Of course, one important principle that limits EU competence in criminal law is 
the subsidiarity principle. According to this principle, the EU (excluding the areas 
that fall within its exclusive competence) can legislate only if the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be reached more effectively at the national, regional or 
local levels, but are better achieved at the EU level because of the scale and effects 
of the proposed action. According to the proportionality principle, the content and 
form of the EU proposed action should also not exceed what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the Treaties (see article 5 of the Treaty on the European 
Union as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon).   
10  The proportionality principle has also been laid down at art. 49 par. 3 of the Char-
ter, which stipulates that the severity of the penalties must not be disproportionate 
to the criminal offence. 
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the European Commission (2015) places great emphasis on the need not to 
interfere with fundamental rights while protecting the security of citizens.11 
More in detail, the first of five key principles is to ‘ensure full compliance [of 
EU CP/security measures] with fundamental rights’. As put it by the Commis-
sion:  
 
“All security measures must comply with the principles of necessity, pro-
portionality and legality, with appropriate safeguards to ensure accounta-
bility and judicial redress. The Commission will strictly test that any secu-
rity measure fully complies with fundamental rights whilst effectively de-
livering its objectives. The impact of any new initiative on free movement 
and the protection of personal data must be fully in line with the propor-
tionality principle, and fundamental rights.”  
 
The proportionality test and the harm principle12 both support the development 
of criminal law – and the creation and implementation of security measures – 
at the EU as well as at national levels. In particular, when it comes to the 
criminalisation of organised crime, the characterisation of the harm is funda-
mental to understand the conceptualisation of organised crime in a given coun-
try. While for example in Italy organised crime is harmful against public order, 
in the UK it is a national security threat – which implies different degrees of 
the seriousness of the offence as well as different responses to such serious-
ness (Sergi, 2017).  
 
The downwards and upwards spirals of crime preven-
tion  
 
As said, behaviours targeted by national and local CP measures are not always 
harmful, ‘serious’ or ‘so-serious’. Yet, they can engender fear – also in light 
of their (close or remote or probable, if any) connection with more serious 
forms of crime like organised crime – among other emotional responses. Al-
                                                          
11  In the Joint declaration on the EU legislative priorities for 2018-9, this appears as 
the first priority area (out of seven). See 
 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/joint-declaration-eus-legislative-
priorities-2018_en. 
12  For the importance of the harm principle in EU criminal law, see Peršak (2018). 
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though these emotional responses ought to be taken into serious consideration, 
not all of them are deserving of protection by criminal law or punitive inter-
ventions.  
 Is the inclusion of harmless, or ‘deviant’ or ‘not-so-serious’ behaviour 
within the field of CP – often involving punitive measures – always legitimate 
and/or desirable? If we consider this matter from the point of view of national 
and local politicians, the answer would most likely be affirmative: punitive 
measures are often an easy and effective way to tap onto individual and col-
lective fears and ensure (re)election. A different response comes from criminal 
law scholars: criminal law – and punitive measures in general – can only be 
used for certain substantive reasons (mostly, harm and offence, as above) and 
following specific formal principles – particularly the proportionality princi-
ple – lest being too intrusive of individual’s liberties. In the next sections, we 
will draw on examples to investigate cases where member states have exces-
sively regulated behaviour that is not necessarily harmful or so-serious, yet 
considered as conducive to further criminality, or ‘serious’, because being 
committed by an ‘organised crime group’. In the final concluding sections, we 
will reflect on the possible soft-law/watchdog role for EU, particularly for the 
EUCPN in cooperation with other relevant EU bodies in the flagging of ex-
cessive national and local CP measures.  
 
Harmless Incivilities 
 
In Italy, as well as in other European countries (Peršak, 2017), punitive secu-
rity measures have been put in place to target a wide range of behaviour con-
sidered a threat to public safety and urban security, or simply distressing or 
annoying to (at least, some) people. Starting from the 1990s, when insecurity 
feelings and fear of crime and disorder became a major concern in Italy, also 
in light of the increased presence of migrants (Pavarini, 2006; Melossi and 
Selmini, 2009), local authorities have been pressured to provide responses to 
crime and disorder at the local level. These pressures led them to apply ad-
ministrative sanctions against “uncivil” people (including, e.g., prostitutes’ 
clients), mostly for violations of road traffic, and public health and safety reg-
ulations.  
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 The 2008 “Security Package” (Pacchetto Sicurezza or decree No 92 of 23 
May 2008) of the then Berlusconi government, legitimised and further broad-
ened the public order competences of local authorities. Through this law de-
cree, local authorities have been given the power to sanction through admin-
istrative fines any conduct considered a threat to the safety and security of 
citizens. More concretely, municipalities have used these powers to sanction 
– and de facto criminalise – not only already criminalised behaviour (such as 
vandalism and drug dealing) but also rather harmless and long tolerated be-
haviour, including (among others) soliciting of prostitution, being drunk in 
public, begging, and littering. The end result has been the production of a scat-
tered regulatory scenario, whereby different behaviours have unevenly been 
regulated in different localities according to the wish of the ruling coalitions 
(and their interpretation of people’s fears and perceptions of the ‘problem(s)’). 
Since the Security Package, moreover, local authorities have also been author-
ised to request the presence of the military on their municipal territory, partic-
ularly to monitor sensible targets (such as the Identification and Expulsion 
Centres for migrants), and patrol city areas in conjunction with the (state and 
municipal) police. This operation, called ‘Safe Streets’ (Strade Sicure), which 
currently deploys 7.100 soldiers across the national territory, is described as 
the “most onerous task of the military in terms of soldiers, resources and ma-
terials” – i.e., more onerous than the operations on which the Italian army is 
deployed on foreign territories.13 
 The exercise of these sanctioning powers has, however, been found illegit-
imate by the Constitutional Court in one of its famous judgments in 2011. In 
this judgement it normatively assessed the legality of local security regulations 
and measures on the basis of the constitutional principles of legality and pro-
portionality. In essence, local regulations have been found in breach of the 
legality principle as they prohibited any behaviour considered by local author-
ities (upon their discretion) a “threat to public safety and security” – rather 
than a conduct whose defining traits had been identified by law and made 
known and predictable to people before its adoption. Local regulation and 
measures have also been found in violation of the proportionality principle as 
they resulted in an excessive state intervention and intrusion into individual’s 
                                                          
13  See http://www.esercito.difesa.it/operazioni/operazioni_nazionali/Pagine/Opera-
zione-Strade-Sicure.aspx. 
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exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms, such as the right to associate, to 
free movement and speech.  
 In overt opposition to this judgment, local authorities have not stopped 
from issuing (illegitimate) orders and applying punitive administrative sanc-
tions, particularly against homeless people, street vendors and prostitutes, who 
in Italy are mostly migrants (Crocitti and Selmini, 2017). Public order powers 
against incivilities have also been recently re-introduced by the Gentiloni gov-
ernment through the so-called “Minniti Decree” (law decree No 17 of 20 Feb-
ruary 2017), which borrows its name from the then Minister of the Interior 
Marco Minniti. According to this decree, municipalities are entrusted with 
adopting orders that aim at protecting the “decorum”, “urban liveability” and 
the “peace and quietness of residents” (art. 8 co. 1 lett. a no 1), and at prevent-
ing “situations that favour the occurrence of criminal phenomena or illegality, 
such as drug dealing, the exploitation of prostitution, begging with the aid of 
minors and disabled people, the illicit occupation of public space [e.g., by un-
authorised street vendors], and violent behaviour, also linked to alcohol or 
substance abuse” (art. 8 co. 1 lett. b No 1). In short, according to this decree 
local measures can target behaviour that falls within the pre-crime stage 
(Pleysier, 2015, 2017), for it favouring or being conducive to ‘serious’ crime, 
such as drug dealing, violence and the exploitation of prostitution.  
 The decree also allows local authorities to punish the behaviour of people 
that “impair[..] the free access and use” (art. 9 co. 1) of “special areas” (mostly, 
areas that have a touristic destination, or are green areas like public parks, see 
art. 9 co. 3) and areas of transit (e.g., train and bus stations) by others in two 
different ways: by applying an administrative fine (up to € 300) and by ban-
ning them from that space for 48 hours (art. 9 co. 1 and art 10. co. 1). The 
length of the ban can be further extended by the police chief (questore) to up 
to six months (or two years, for a person who in the past five years had been 
found guilty of an offence against the person or property), if the banned person 
reiterates the prohibited conduct and providing that such a behaviour “may 
lead to a threat to security” (art. 10 co. 2).14  
                                                          
14  According to media accounts, many bans have so far seemingly been used against 
asylum seekers and refugees. See e.g. https://www.fanpage.it/a-genova-il-decreto-
minniti-divide-contro-i-bivacchi-arrivano-i-dissuasori-di-seduta/.  
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 Clearly, all these provisions of the “Minniti decree” are based on very 
vague concepts (such as the ones of “decorum” and “liveability”) and on neb-
ulous definitions of the proscribed behaviour, which include: “situations that 
favour the occurrence of criminal phenomena or illegality”, and “behaviours 
that impair the free access and use” of specific and special areas by others 
“that may lead to a threat to security”. Similarly to the 2008 Security Package, 
also the legislative vagueness of this more recent decree opens up possibilities 
for abuses and for a quite arbitrary exclusion of unwanted people from public 
spaces by local authorities. 
 This legislative framework is (at least partly) the result of dominant repre-
sentations of ‘problems’ and solutions, which have been presented by relevant 
actors (such as politicians) in the media overtime, in particular against mi-
grants. For example, a longitudinal study that has analysed media representa-
tions of the local regulation of street prostitution in the national press from 
2008 (the year of the adoption of the Security Package) until 2017 (Di Ronco, 
2017), suggested that the ‘problem’ of street prostitution has been amplified 
in much of the news through the link with other “problems”.  These are par-
ticularly connected to other cases of social disorder (e.g., public drunkenness, 
rowdy behaviour), physical disorder (e.g., littering), and crime proper (e.g., 
drug dealing, physical assault). All these ‘problems’ have been deemed to con-
tribute to the decay of neighbourhoods attended by middle class families, es-
pecially residential areas, city centres, areas of transit and of summer vacation. 
To overcome the ‘emergence’ and revitalise ‘degenerating’ districts, politi-
cians in the press – mostly using a sensationalistic rhetoric – have invoked the 
need to increase the presence of police officers. This presence was made grim 
by a militarised appearance with heavy weapons, which are usually not carried 
by the police in Italy, and by the military. In addition, reference was made to 
the need of enhancing the public order powers of local authorities (including 
through administrative fines against both sex workers and clients). 
 Similar results emerge from a longitudinal study conducted over a similar 
period of time (from 2007 until the end of May 2017), which explored the 
representations of migrants (particularly, asylum seekers and refugees) in the 
local press of two different cities run by different political coalitions (centre-
left in Udine and right in Padova) (Di Ronco and Lavorgna, in this volume). 
Either because of their association with social and physical disorder (in Udine) 
or with crime proper (in Padova, where crime has mostly consisted of sexual 
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assaults, and gangs-related criminal activities such as drug dealing and vio-
lence), migrants in both cities have been identified as a ‘problem’ enhancing 
citizens’ fears and making urban living ‘unbearable’. Once more, politicians 
in both cities have advocated the use of the military, the enhanced presence of 
the police and of the use of administrative fines, as the ideal solutions to the 
‘problem’. This was presented as the key strategies to regaining control of 
areas that have been ‘invaded’ by unwanted migrants (Di Ronco and La-
vorgna, in this volume).    
 In short, in Italy punitive and excessive measures (so judged by the national 
constitutional court) have been adopted by local authorities mostly against mi-
grants (Crocitti and Selmini, 2017), who sometimes (for instance in the case 
of homeless and street sex workers) have been penalised for their mere un-
wanted presence in certain areas and their easy association with disorder and 
crime. This penalisation (and the granting of enhanced public order powers to 
local authorities by the national legislator) has been fed by the need of re-
sponding to the increasing fears and anxieties felt among Italian citizens, who 
seem to be particularly concerned about the perceived worsening standards of 
living (in terms of increased levels of disorder, crime, and social diversity) in 
‘their’ neighbourhoods.        
 
Not so serious Organised Crime 
 
In the UK, the current system regulating gang injunctions provides a good 
example of both upwards and downwards spirals of crime prevention. In es-
sence, on one side the seriousness of organised crime absorbs gang-related 
crimes, and on the other side, the aim of prevention of gang-related activity 
leads to more punitive responses for both adults and teenagers deemed to be 
involved in “gangs” (for a critical account of the gang label, see Alexander, 
2008).  
 Gang injunctions are civil orders that have first been introduced by the Po-
licing and Crime Act 2009; they are aimed at preventing gang-related violence 
and criminal activity. Terms imposed can (for example) prevent or restrict as-
sociation with other gang members, prohibit travel to certain areas, prevent 
the congregation of people in groups of three or restrict individuals from pos-
sessing more than one mobile telephone. It can also prevent the promotion of 
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gang related activity on social networking sites. With the Crime and Security 
Act 2010 and the Crime and Courts Act 2013 these provisions have been ap-
plied to 14 to 17 year olds with the involvement of Youth Court and Youth 
Offending Teams. Research shows that there has been violence reduction as-
sociated to locations where gang injunctions have been used (Carr, Slothower 
and Parkinson, 2017). However, the Serious Crime Act 2015 amended the 
statutory definition of what comprises a ‘gang’ to make it less restrictive and 
expanded the scope of the activity, to include groups involved in drug activity.  
 Currently, a gang under revised section 34 of the Policing and Crime Act 
2009 (a) consists of at least three people; (b) has one or more characteristics 
that enable its members to be identified by others as a group and; (c) engages 
in gang-related violence or is involved in the illegal drug market. The identi-
fying characteristics of a gang may, but need not, relate to any of the follow-
ing: (a) the use by the group of a common name, emblem or colour; The 
group’s leadership or command structure; (b) the group’s association with a 
particular area; (c) the group’s involvement with a particular unlawful activity. 
Crucially, this definition and the inclusion of illegal drugs as an element for 
requesting an injunction, substantially homologates gangs with organised 
crime groups. There remains one difference: the local level focus of the gangs 
and the expectation that the latter could have national or international reach. 
 Differently from the highly contested Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (AS-
BOs), whose breach consisted in a criminal offence, the consequences of 
breaching a gang injunction are not criminal per se. Breaching of a gang in-
junction amounts to civil content of court - even though arrest, remand in cus-
tody, followed by a prison sentence are still possibilities depending on the 
nature of the breach. The main issue with these injunctions, therefore, is not 
in the technicality of the provision, but rather in the overlapping between con-
cepts and norms of gangs and concepts and norms of organised crime groups. 
The language of gangs – both adult and youth gangs – and organised crime 
constantly intersects across UK policy and law enforcement approaches 
(Sergi, 2017). Similarly, competences of institutions and agencies tackling 
both tend to overlap too. In fact, even though local police forces and local 
authorities are the ones to initiate an application for a gang injunction, the 
National Crime Agency’s (NCA), which is the agency leading the fight against 
organised crime, is often involved in investigations of gangs at local level. 
This is because the NCA focuses on illegal drugs markets and trends and 
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therefore monitors both both organised crime groups as well as local gangs – 
as a division is in practice quite impossible. The NCA also considers gangs a 
pathway into drug criminality at a more sophisticated level. As the NCA 
(2018: 10) notices: 
 
“Young people brought up in deprived neighbourhoods by fragmented 
families are more susceptible to members of commodity-based OCGs or 
street gangs looking to recruit. Initially these young people can become 
involved in anti-social behaviour and petty crime before progressing into 
more significant criminality”. 
 
As the NCA’s mandate is on serious and organised crime, local gang activities 
involving drug smuggling – which would often not pass the threshold of seri-
ousness – are essentially included de facto within the agency’s mandate. 
Moreover, as the Home Office has been promoting local partnerships to fight 
organised crime, the cross-over between the NCA’s activities and those of lo-
cal police forces against drug markets is a well-known consequence (Home 
Office, 2013). Further proof of this is the function the NCA has assumed 
within the Home Office’s programme “Ending Gang Violence and Exploita-
tion (EGVE)” re-launched in 2016. The NCA carries out assessments of 
county lines – which is the phenomenon of gangs moving into drug markets 
outside urban areas where they usually operate. As vulnerable and young local 
people are groomed and/or coerced into moving or selling drugs, and the 
homes of vulnerable adults can be taken over as a base from which drugs are 
sold, the NCA has to step in. It provides an assessment of the situation, the 
nature and scale of the problem, and leads the national response together with 
local policing. In practice this means that the NCA – a national security and 
intelligence-led agency – is using its intrusive powers against less serious 
forms of organised crime irrespective of the proportionality principle. There-
fore, this also translates in a downward spiral of crime prevention. That a na-
tional intelligence and security agency influences, more or less directly, the 
policing of street crime in the form of (youth) gangs – which might be, but not 
necessarily are, ‘serious’ forms of criminality according to the legal frame-
work – means essentially securitising policing work, i.e. making traditional 
policing an instrument to deliver national security. This, in practice, results in 
the justification of special measures of prevention and disruption, which might 
be asked of police forces in the name of national security.  
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 At the same time, in an upward spiral of crime prevention, gangs and or-
ganised crime groups are increasingly becoming interchangeable concepts – 
even though the harm they pose to communities is quite different – thus ele-
vating the status of gang criminality to national security levels. In essence, a 
too big (legal) hammer is used for a small social nail risks causing more harm 
than the one that it tries to reduce in the first place.  
 
 
Discussion –  
Is there a role for the EU in ensuring that national and local CP 
policy and practice are not excessive? 
 
Many EU countries have expanded the remit and reach of their CP complex. 
In this chapter, we have used the cases of Italy and the UK to illustrate the 
expansion in CP both downwards and upwards. In Italy, ‘unwanted’ people 
like migrants have been targeted with punitive measures (mostly administra-
tive fines and location bans). People’s fears have played a key role here: white 
middle-class Italians tend to feel rather uncomfortable and unsafe, also in the 
light of the association (rather unproblematised yet reinforced by politicians 
also through the media) of migrants with disorder and crime. In the UK, indi-
viduals may experience severe restrictions of their fundamental rights (includ-
ing their rights to free movement, and to associate and assemble in public 
spaces) because of their alleged membership of, or participation in, a “gang” 
– a concept that is very vaguely defined by the relevant legislation and poli-
cies. In addition, gang-related activities, in particular when involving drugs, 
are equated with organised crime activities and are thus tackled by the NCA.15 
CP measures as these are often excessive in their scope, especially if the harm 
                                                          
15  Another example is provided by 2003 Act Furthering Integrity of Decisions by 
Public Administration (or Bibob Act) in The Netherlands, which gives local au-
thorities the power to decide on applications for licences and to reject or withdraw 
them in case infiltration of serious and organised crime groups is detected or seri-
ously suspected. According to van Duyne and van der Vorm (2015), this power 
has essentially been used not that much to target organised crime, but nuisance 
and public order disturbances (particularly, pub violation of closing times, noise 
levels and public nuisance rules, dirty restaurants etc.) with great repercussions on 
people’s privacy and other fundamental freedoms.  
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(if any) they aim at preventing is compared to the effect they have on individ-
uals, their liberties, possibilities of integration, and social opportunities. 
 Crime prevention – and especially, within it, the power to legislate in crim-
inal matters – has historically been considered a national competence and has 
belonged to the sovereignty of member states. The European Council’s meet-
ings in Tampere, The Hague and Stockholm, have progressively paved the 
way for the Treaty of Lisbon and, therefore, to an EU expanded competence 
in CP matters. This competence was justified by the shared interest to create 
an Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). Going beyond that was the 
aim of combating crime having a cross-border dimension, including OC and 
terrorism along with other ‘Euro-crimes’. This relative long process, which 
has resulted into the broadening of the EU CP competences, has not been met 
without resistance from the member states (Baker, 2010).16  
 As a result, the EU competence in CP is anything but broad. As seen above, 
although the proportionality and legality principles in CP or security measures 
have been given legal recognition at the EU level (particularly, in the Charter), 
their violations by member states are not enforceable by EU bodies – unless 
they involve the implementation of EU law. In short, the EU has little to no 
power to ‘tell off’ member states for their eventual excessive use of CP 
measures. This notwithstanding, the EU has a number of bodies that can act 
as watchdog against excessively punitive CP measures against harmless inci-
vilities (mainly, discriminatory practices against specific social groups) and 
non-so serious crime, which has yet been subsumed into the area of organised 
crime.      
 The European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN), for example, is an EU 
body that has been established in 2001 with the specific mandate of supporting 
CP initiatives and activities at the national and local levels. The network has 
in the past few years worked towards the promotion of cooperation between 
member states as well as between local authorities. It has mainly pursued this 
                                                          
16  The EU competence in criminal law, for example, is limited, among others, by the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. According to the former principle, 
the EU can only legislate in criminal matters if the goal cannot be reached more 
effectively with measures at the national, regional or local levels. In light of the 
latter principle, the EU ability to harmonise criminal law should not exceed what 
is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties. 
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aim by making available through its online knowledge centre17 information 
regarding best practices in national and local CP, which have been collected 
through its national contact points.  
 In the past few years, there have been proposals to enhance the powers of 
the network. In the Stockholm Programme,18 for example, the Council sug-
gested converting it into the Observatory for the Prevention of Crime. The 
European Commission (2012) suggested providing it with a better resourced 
Secretariat instead (EUCPN+ and observatory type of functions). These pro-
posals have led in 2015 to the project entitled “the development of the obser-
vatory function of the European Centre of Expertise in the Prevention of 
Crime within the EUCPN” (EUCPN, 2015a, p. 14), which has strengthened 
the work of the EUCPN Secretariat around five ‘pillars’ (EUCPN, 2015a). 
Two of these ‘pillars’ are based on the goals to support and assist national and 
local policy makers as well as practitioners in their daily CP work and to dis-
seminate qualitative knowledge on CP (EUCPN, 2015c). The goals of dissem-
inating qualitative knowledge on crime prevention and of supporting crime 
prevention activities at national and local level both with knowledge (includ-
ing evaluations) and assistance in funding applications, have also been reiter-
ated in one of the network’s most recent Working Programmes (EUCPN, 
2018) and in its Multiannual Strategy 2016-2020 (EUCPN, 2015b). 
 In sum, the EUCPN seems to be the best placed to provide guidance to 
member states and local authorities in their CP efforts. This ideal advisory role 
of the network is reinforced both by the increased competences and resources 
of its Secretariat (as reflected in its goals and plans of action),19 and by the EU 
focus on protecting individual’s fundamental rights while adopting and imple-
menting CP measures at the EU, national and local levels. At a practical level, 
this means that, especially when requested by national and local authorities, 
the network should be able to warn them against possible violations of funda-
mental EU-principles, such as the legality and proportionality principles. In 
addition, it should also advise them against the adoption of ‘bad’ practices, 
and share with them the best ones, i.e. those that deliver security with the least 
                                                          
17  See eucpn.org/knowledge-center.  
18  OJ C 115 of 4 May 2010.  
19 For the increased funding and personnel available to the EUCPN, see 
https://eucpn.org/about/network?language=24.  
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compression of individual’s freedoms. The EUCPN can do so also by partner-
ing up with other relevant EU bodies, including: the European Network on the 
Administrative Approach tackling serious and organised crime (ENAA), 
which is already embedded in the EUCPN; the Agency for Fundamental 
Rights (FRA); the European Forum for Urban Safety (EFUS); Eurojust, and 
Europol.  
 
 
Concluding thoughts  
 
This chapter has used the two case studies of the Italian security regulation 
and of the UK gang legislation to illustrate how CP in European member states 
has often expanded both upwards and downwards. It did so by equating inci-
vilities to crime and not-so serious crime to organised crime. But in both di-
rections this erodes individual’s rights and violates the proportionality princi-
ple. Expanded CP is also mushrooming a multitude of bodies and agencies 
that are competent in CP at the local, national and European levels. At the EU 
level, this has occurred more substantially from the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon 
onwards, when the EU has been given competences to (among others) approx-
imate definitions of and sanctions for ‘Euro Crimes’ and facilitate and pro-
mote police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters between member 
states mainly through EU bodies such as Europol and Eurojust. This extension 
of CP powers at the EU level has, however, come along with the recognition 
of the need to respect people’s rights while delivering security and, therefore, 
with the duty for the Union, its member states and local authorities within 
them, of not imposing measures that have a disproportionate effect on indi-
vidual’s autonomy. We have suggested that the EU – particularly through the 
EUCPN and other ‘soft law’ bodies and networks – could play a role in facil-
itating the compliance of national and local CP measures with the proportion-
ality principle. This does not mean, however, that this role will be taken up by 
the EU and its networks, or that – if exercised – it will be effective in persuad-
ing member states and local authorities not to adopt excessive CP measures. 
In the end, we cannot ignore the fact that the field of CP is very much politi-
cised and that crime and fear of crime – and discourses around them – have 
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proven in recent years to be crucial to decide elections and positions of polit-
ical power. The urge of showing to the electorate that ‘problems’ and ‘serious 
threats’ are being handled – and preferably handled with a firm hand – by the 
relevant institutions and bodies, may ultimately frustrate (as has certainly done 
so in the past) the need to balance security with the safeguarding of funda-
mental rights.  
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